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SOME CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS ON
ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES
INTRODUCTION

As is indicated by the -title, this article will attempt to deal with some
ramifications of both the Wyoming and United States Constitutions as
applied to administrative agencies.
Due to space limitations the scope of this article has necessarily been
limited to treatment of the following subjects: (1) When is a hearing
required and what are the requirements of a proper hearing; (2) Separation of function; (3) Retroactivity; (4) Extradordinary writs; (5) Constitutional agencies; (6) Artcile 3, Section 24 of the Wyoming Constitution.
Other subjects with constitutional ramifications such as delegation and
investigation are discussed elsewhere in this symposium.
CONSTITUTIONAL

RIGHT TO A HEARING

A hearing is an oral proceeding before a tribunal, and of two principal kinds-trials and arguments. The parties may present evidence
(written or oral or both) argue, explain, cross-examine and rebutt in a
trial type hearing. The tribunal then makes its determination on the
record.' An argument is that type of hearing where the parties attempt
to establish the validity of their contentions solely by a course of reasoning
rather than by the presentation of evidence with cross-examination and
rebuttal.2 Many statutes expressly provide for a hearing. However, the
following discussion has reference only to situations in which the statute
does not require a hearing.
The three instances where it would appear clear that no hearing would
be required are: (1) When the agency is conducting ex parte investigations
presumably as possible basis for further proceedings; (2) When the agency
is using testing or examinations in lieu of a hearing, and (3) When summary proceedings are made necessary by an emergency.
Except when a trial type hearing is constitutionally required, and in the
absence of a statute, due process probably does not require a hearing of any
3
sort. The authority for this proposition is somewhat unsatisfactory.
The basic requirement of due process is fair play. 4 If the parties
involved may be treated fairly without a hearing, due process will not
require one. Under certain circumstances, however, a trial type hearing is
a constitutional necessity. What are these circumstances? Davis suggests
that when adjudicative facts are involved a trial type hearing is required.5
Davis defines adjudicative facts as "facts about the parties and their activities, businesses, and properties .. .usually answer the questions of who did
what, where, how, why, with what motive or intent; . . . are roughly the
1. Davis, Administrative Law Text § 7.01 at p. 113 (1958).
2. Black Law Dictionary, 4th ed. (1951).

3. Davis, Administrative Law Text § 7.01 (1958).
4.
5.

Morgan v. United States, 304 U.S. 1 (1937), rehearing denied, 304 U.S. 1 (1937).
Davis, Administrative Law Text § 7.20 at p. 142 (1958).
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NOTES

kind of facts that go to a jury in a jury case. Legislative facts do not
usually concern the immediate parties but are general facts which help
the tribunal decide questions of law, policy, and discretion."f Some
reasons why no trial type hearing is necessary for legislative facts and why
other methods including oral argument may be more desirable in the area
of legislative facts will be discussed below. No hearing would be required
in an investigatory proceeding, whether the activity is being conducted
by an official or by the entire agency.' Inspection and testing are often
superior to the trial type of hearing, and are frequently substituted for the
hearing-type procedure in appropriate cases. 8 For example, a trial type
hearing certainly would be inferior to inspection and testing in determining whether or not a bridge was safe and made of proper materials. Courts
have also in emergency-type situations permitted summary procedures
based only on investigation even when destruction of property and personal liberty were involved. 9
If a party cannot get a hearing in advance of the seizure and destruction, the Supreme Court has held that he has the right to have it afterwards.' 0 The Court also said that such a person, in exercising this right,
may bring an action for the destruction of his property, and in that action
those who destroyed it can only successfully defend if the jury shall find
the facts as claimed by them to be true. 1
This would seem to be a
deterrent to arbitrary action.
In Londoner v. Denver,1 2 the United States Supreme Court, after holding that under the particular circumstances due process required a hearing,
said, "A hearing in its very essence demands that he who is entitled to it
shall have the right to support his allegations by argument however brief,
and if need be, by proof, however informal." The case involved an assessment for public improvements, but was a rather unique situation. There
were only a few individual land owners, and they were exceptionally
affected due to the fact that the law under which the assessing board was
acting denied them the right to object in the courts, objections being only
cognizable by the board. Thus, this case should be limited to its special
situation, especially when considered with subsequent cases decided by the
Supreme Court. One such case is Bi-Mettalic Investment Co. v. State
Board of Equalization.8
This case was substantially the same as the
6.
7.
8.
9.

10.
11.
12.
13.

Ibid.
73 C.J.S. 98 (1955); Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 421 (1959).
See generally, I Davis, Administrative Law Treatise, § 7.09. at pp. 445-448. Also
see Report of Attorney General Commission, Ad. Proc. 36-38 (1941).
North American Cold Storage Co. v. Chicago, 211 U.S. 306 (1908); Lauton v.
Steele, 152 U.S. 133 (1894) ; People ex rel. Copcutt v. Board of Health, 14 N.Y. 1,
35 N.E. 320 (1893) ; State v. Schriber, 185, Ore. 615, 205 P.2d 149 (1949) ; State ex
rel. McBride v. Sup. Ct., 103 Wash. 409, 174 Pac. 973 (1918); Coletti v. Cassidy,
12 F. Supp. 21 (Wyo.); Bowden v. Davis, 205 Ore. 421, 289 P.2d 1100 (1955). Also
see Cox v. Cox, 400 111. 291, 79 N.E.2d 497 (1948), and Lacy v. Lemmons, 22 N.M.
54, 159 Pac. 949 (1916).
Santa Clara County v. Southern Pacific Railroad, 118 U.S. 394 (1886).
Ibid.
Londoner v. Denver, 210 U.S. 373, 386 (1908).
Bi-Metallic Investment Co. v. State Board of Equalization, 239 U.S. 441 (1915).
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Londoner case except that the Board's action involved a 40% increase in
valuation of all taxable property in Denver, Colorado. Here the Court
realized the impracticability of affording everyone involved a hearing,
and said that the Constitution does not require all public acts to be done
in town meeting or an assembly of the whole. Thus the Londoner case is
consistent with the Bi-Mettalic case in terms of the "Davis test," because the
Bi-Metallic case involved legislative facts, and the Court was correct in
holding that no hearing was constitutionally required.
The Wyoming Supreme Court has held that a horizontal increase in
valuation of all property of a class or classes without notice to the taxpayers
is not a denial of due process.14 In so holding the Wyoming Supreme Court
followed the Mi-Metallic case.
In W.J.R., The Good Will Station v. F.C.C.15 the Court put it that the
right of oral argument as a matter of procedural due process varies from
case to case in accordance with differing circumstances, as do other procedural reglations. The Court also stated that arguments may be written
or oral, 'but it gave no useful guides to determine in what circumstances,
if any, due process may require an opportunity for oral argument. However, one case by the United States Emergency Court of Appeals 16 is rather
helpful in this respect. The Court said that rent control is purely a legislative function, and thus, a hearing was not required, but that if facts
about the particular property (adjudicative facts) were in dispute, a denial
of a -trial type of hearing would be a denial of due process. When both
adjudicative and legislative facts are present in any given proceeding, it
would seem that trial type hearing would be constitutionally required
with respect to the former.
17
Professor Davis' summary of the situation seems sound:
The true principle is that a party who has a sufficient interest
at stake in a determination of governmental action should be
entitled to an opportunity to know and to meet, with the weapons
of rebuttal evidence, cross-examination, and argumen.t, unfavorable evidence of adjudicative facts, except in the rare circumstances
when some other interest, such as national security, justifies an
overriding of the interest in fair hearing.

Generally, when a privilege or a mere gratuity is involved, as distinguished from a "right," the Supreme Court has said that there is no constitutional right to a hearing or judicial review.' 8 But, as Professor Davis
has pointed out 19 it is difficult to classify the decisions neatly under the
"privilege or right" dichotomy. He points out that "right" is not synonymous with "life," "liberty," and "property," and the "privilege" is not
synonoymous with absence of an interest involving life, liberty, or property.
14.
15.
16.

17.
18.
19.

Baker v. Paxton, 29 Wyo. 500, 540, 215 Pac. 257 (1923).
W.J.R., The Good Will Station v. F.C.C., 337 U.S. 265 (1948).
150 East 47th Street Corporation v. Creedon, 162 F.2d 206 (1947).

1 Davis, Administrative Law Treatise, § 7.02 at p. 412 (1958).
United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537 (1950).
Davis, Administrative Law Treatise, § 7.11 at p. 454 (1958).

NOTES

For example, the discharged cabinet officer may have a property interest in
job and in his reputation, but nevertheless we want the President to have
an unrestricted power to discharge him. One who seeks a pardon has his
life or his liberty at stake, but what he seeks is still a "privilege" or an act
of grace. Davis says that the plain fact is that courts often give the legal
protection of a hearing to what they persist in calling privileges.2 0 A
passport, for example, while now considered a right, used to be treated as
2 1
privilege.
Public employment when the job is not considered sensitive, i.e.,
involves national security, is considered property within the meaning of
life, liberty, and property in the Constitution of the United States.2 2 Yet
the Supreme Court equally divided in the Bailey case, cited above, affirmed
the lower court's holding that there was no constitutional right to public
employment, and thus no right to cross-examine or even know the exact
charges although Miss Bailey occupied a non-sensitive position. However,
this case has been partially overruled by the Wieman case, cited above, and
inferentially overruled by the Greene case though not specifically. The
latter case was not decided upon constitutional grounds, but it certainly
had a constitutional overtone. An engineer's security clearance was revoked,
and as a result his employer, who was a private manfacturer under a
government contract, discharged him. In the several hearings given him
no evidence was presented against him and the board relied upon confidential reports not made available to him. The Court held that the
engineer should have been allowed the right to cross-examine.
The Court said:
Explicit action, especially in areas of doubtful constitutionality,
requires careful and purposeful consideration by those responsible
for enacting and implementing our laws. .

.

. Where administra-

tive action has raised serious constitutional problems, the Court
has assumed that Congress or the President intended to afford
those affected by the action -the traditional safeguard of due
process.
The Court has also held that a person has a right to meet the evidence
against him upon applying for a license to practice before the Board of
21
Tax Appeals as an accountant so far as adjudicative facts are concerned.
Whether or not the practice of law is a right or a privilege, an application
for admission to the -bar is governed by the principles of procedural due
process. 2 4 The Wyoming Supreme Court has held that an incumbent of a
20.

21.
22.
23.
24.

See also Clarke v. Board of Collegiate Authority, 327 Mass. 279, 284, 98 N.E.2d 273,
276 (1951) ; Walker v. City of Clinton, 244 Iowa 1099, 1102-1103, 59 N.W.2d 785, 787
(1953); Bailey v. Richardson, 86 U.S. App. D.C. 248, 182 F.2d 46, affirmed by
equally divided court, 341 U.S. 918 (1951). This case has been overruled although
not specifically by Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474 (1959) ; McAuliffe v. City of
New Bedford, 155 Mass. 216, 220, 29 N.E. 517 (1892).
Boudin v. Dulles, 136 F. Supp. 218 (D.C. 1955); Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116 (1958).
Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474 (1959); and Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183
(1952).
Goldsmith v. United States Board of Tax Appeals, 270 U.S. 117 (1925).
See also Menkoff v.
Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232 (1948).
Payne, 210 F.2d 689 (1953).
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public office has a substantial right, and if appointed for a definite term
may be removed only after being given notice of the charges against him
and a hearing.25 Whether the hearing is adequate or not depends upon
the circumstances of the case and is not determined from a technical or
formal standpoint, in the absence of legislation on the subject. The Wyoming Court in Lake De Smet Reservoir Company v. Kaufman26 dealt
directly with the problem of the requirements of a hearing. The case
involved an action to enforce payment for sale of surplus water at rates
found by a board of special commissioners. The Court held that the
hearing in which the rate to be charged for the water was determined was
not adequate because of its brevity and lack - of notice. The Court
indicated that an adequate hearing in such a matter is required by due
process. The Court held that for such a hearing to be adequate persons
directly affected must be given adequate notice and opportunity to appear
and present evidence. Furthermore, the board or agency must consider
all relevant evidence and arguments. Although it was within the discretion of the board whether or not to require discovery and production of
certain information contained in the company's books and records, because
this evidence directly affected the merits of the case, to afford an adequate
hearing, the board must consider it before making its decision.
However, the Wyoming Court has held that whatever rights an applicant for a liquor license has are dependent upon the statute, and that the
due process clause of the Federal Constitution is not involved in the denial
of an application, even though it might be when such a license is sought
to be revoked. 27 The statute involved provided that the license to sell
intoxicating liquor is a mere personal privilege, and that any rejected
applicant was not entitled to a trial de novo or an appeal. The Court by
way of dictum indicated that a party renewing did have the right to a trial
de novo and/or an appeal. The Cowan and- Whiteside cases seem to
align Wyoming definitely with courts which have adopted the privilege-right
classification. Furthermore, they raise the implication that a mere privilege
or gratuity may blossom into a constitutionally protected right.
While state courts go many ways in their decisions concerning "rights
vs. privileges," the federal courts seem to adhere to the principle that a
trial type hearing is required if issues of adjudicative fact are involved
when important interests are at stake and in the absence of a sufficient
reason for refusing or modifying the trial type aspect. Professor Davis
suggests three basic propositions: 28 1. "Constitutional principles of substantive and procedural fairness apply even when a privilege is at stake and
even when the privilege itself is not directly entitled to legal protection."
25.
26.
27.

28.

Cowan v. State ex rel. Scherck, 57 Wyo. 240, 131 P.2d 300 (1942).
Lake De Semt Reservoir Co. v. Kaufmann, 75 Wyo. 87, 292 P.2d 482 (1955).
Whitesides v. Council of Ctiy of Cheyenne, 319 P.2d 520, 78 Wyo. 80 (1958). The
Court cited Crowley v. Christensen, 137 U.S. 86, 91 (1890), which stated that. in such
only a privilege or gratuity was involved, and thus the due process clause did not
apply.
Davis, Administrative Law Text, § 7.12, p. 127.
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2. "Privileges as well as rights are entitled to legal protection." 3. "When
a privilege is combined with another interest the combination may be a
right and accordingly entitled to a legal protection."
It would seem that some of the characteristics of a trial type hearing
may be relaxed in administrative adjudications. Administrative proceedings are not criminal proceedings or suits of common law, and thus, neither
the Sixth and Seventh Amendments of the Federal Constitution nor Article
1, Sections 9 through 11 of the Wyoming Constitution apply. Sometimes,
at least, affording confrontation and cross-examination of witnesses is
discretionary with agency. For example, it has been held that one is
afforded a fair hearing if he is given a fair resume of the evidence against
him, even though he is not permitted to see the investigator's report
29
which the tribunal used in reaching its decision.
A denial of a jury in an administrative -proceeding is not a violation of
any constitutionally

guaranteed

rights.8 0

Furthermore,

the Wyoming

Supreme Court has held that the constitutional provisions guaranteeing
the right of trial by jury in criminal cases may not apply when the activity
of the defendant affected that public interest and thus came within the
police powers of the state to enjoin a crime. 8 1 Thus, the defendant might
not only be penalized for violating the Act, but also for contempt.
There is no federal constitutional right to counsel in an administrative
proceeding. 32 The Supreme Court of the United States held this to be so
by a 5-4 decision in the Groban case even though the purpose of the
hearing was to determine whether the person involved should be prosecuted
for arson.
Although in certain situations (as we have noted supra) there is a
constitutional requirement of notice, unless notice is constituionally
required or required by statute, it is unnecessary. 33 The time and place of
the hearing are within the discretion of the agency. 34 The Supreme Court
29.
30.
31.

32.

33.
34.

United States v. Nugent, 346 U.S. 1 (1953).

See also Shaugnessy v. United States

ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206 (1953) . Contra, Greene v. McElory, 360 U.S. 474 (1959);
Wiemann v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952).
Guthrie National Bank v. City of Guthrie, 173 U.S. 528 (1899); N.L.R.B. v.
Reinecke, 275 U.S. 101 (1927); Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414 (1944).
See also, State v. Sorrentino,
State v. Grimshaw, 49 Wyo. 192, 53 P.2d 13 (1935).
36 Wyo. 111, 253 Pac. 14 (1927), in which the Court holds that jury trial is not a
necessary requisite to due process; and State v. Bolin, 10 Wyo. 439, 70 Pac. 1 (1901),
in which the Court held that there was no constitutional right to any particular
method of selecting a jury. Neither the A.P.A. nor the Revised Model Act give
the right to a jury.
In re Groban, 352 U.S. 330 (1957) ; Art. 1, § 10 of the Wyoming Constitution is
Section 6 (a) of the Administrative Procedure Act
limited to criminal cases.
confers the right to counsel upon a party to an investigation only if he is forced
to appear. The Revised Model State Administrative Procedure Act (4th draft)
does not specifically provide for right to counsel. However, in the absence of
emergency action or matters involving the public health, safety, and welfare, each
party is afforded an opportunity to present evidence and arguments. Thus, the
right to counsel may be implied.
North Laramie Land Co. v. Hoffman, 30 Wyo. 238, 219 Pac. 561 (1924) ; Farm Investment Co. v. Carpenter et al., 9 Wyo. 110, 61 Pac. 258 (1900); 73 C.J.S. 131;
also see W.R.C.P. Rules 4 and 5.
73 C.J.S. 133, 134 (1955); 1 Davis, Administrative Law Treatise, § 8.08 (1958).
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has held that the constitutional requirement of a hearing does not mean
that the hearing must be held at the initial stage, or at any particular point,
or at more than one point in an administrative proceeding so long as the
requisite hearing is held before final order becomes effective. 35 Due process usually requires notice where it also requires a hearing, such as in
adjudicatory proceedings.3 6 The Supreme Court of Wyoming has held
that brevity of hearing and lack of notice can deprive a person of a fair
hearing.3 7 However, when there is an adequate provision for judicial
review, notice and hearing within the administrative proceeding are sometimes held not to be necessary. 38 Where there are statutory provisions for
39
notice, these must be substantially complied with.
The writer can find no cases determining whether or not an administrative hearing must be public. Professor Davis suggests that the usual
problem is not the agency's denial of a public hearing, but rather the
agency's insistence upon a public hearing where a private party is urging
secrecy. 40 The Supreme Court of the United States has upheld the agency's
position in these cases. 41 The Supreme Court of Wyoming has held that
the very nature of the activities of a quasi judicial board requires that its
meetings be open to interested persons, but that the fact that a hearing is
private will not per se render the hearing unfair and partial of the parties
concerned were premitted -to present their theories of their respective cases.
The Wyoming Court also said that the right to a public hearing should
not prevent the agency from having private sessions for planning or
42
deliberation.
BIAS

Bias may render a hearing unfair. The term "bias" may have as many
as four different meanings: 1. A preconceived point of view about issues of
law or policy (e.g., American's bias for democratic methods). 2. A prejudgment concerning the issues of fact about the parties in a particular case
(the presence of too much of this type will disqualify, but a judge or an
administrator who has decided the particular question in a previous case
will not be disqualified solely because of this) . 3. Personal bias or prejudice (when strong enough this will disqualify) . 4. Direct pecuniary
interest (this will always disqualify).
35.

Orcutt v. Crawford, 85 F.2d 146 (1936), cert. denied, 299 U.S. 594 (1936); Opp
Cotton Mills v. Administrator, 312 U.S. 126, 152-154 (1941).

36.

Knauff v. Watkins, C.A.N.Y., 173 F.2d 599

37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.

(2d Cir. 1949),

affirmed, 338 U.S. 537

(1950) ; Nulter v. State Road Commission of West Virginia, 119 W.Va. 312, 193
S.E. 549 (1937).
Lake De Smet Reservoir Co. v. Kaufmann, 75 Wyo. 87, 229 P.2d 482; School Dist.
No. 9, in the county of Fremont v. District Boundary Board in and for Fremont
County, Wyo. 351, P.2d 106 (1960).
Ibid. See also Brinegar v. Clark, 371 P.2d 62, 66 (Wyo. 1962).
Ashbacker Radio Corporation v. Federal Communications Commission, 326 U.S.
327 (1945).
Davis, Administrative Law Text, § 8.09 at p. 142 (1958).
See, for example, Utah Fuel Co. v. National Bituminous Coal Commission, 306 U.S.
56 (1939).
Cases cited, supra note 37.
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In the fourth Morgan case,4 a the Supreme Court held that the fact that
the Secretary of Agriculture wrote a letter to the New York Times criticizing
the Court's decision in the second Morgan case 44 did not make him unfit to
exercise his duty in the subsequent proceedings. If prejudgment of issues
result from a prior official investigation, then there ordinarily will be no
disqualification. 45

Professor Davis puts it that,46 "Belief must not be so

unyielding as to smother the contributions that alert practical administration may make to the molding and remolding of policy. And yet a dominant point of view or bias may appropriately color all activities, including
Even an examiner who previously
even the fact-finding function."
announced a position concerning an appraisal of particular facts which
he later had to appraise in an adjudication was not disqualified. The
Supreme Court said that judge is not disqualified from sitting in a retrial
because he was reversed on earlier rulings, and that a stiffer rule should
7
not be applied to administrative agencies.4
Federal district judges may be disqualified for personal bias or prejudice4 s but not for nonpersonal bias or prejudice. The judge's attitude
is not personal unless it involves animosity toward a party, as distinguished
from favoritism on the issues. A judge was disqualified when he made
comments to the effect that he preferred a safeblower to the defendant who
was being tried for espionage. 49 However, total rejection of an opposed
view does not of itself show that the trier of fact holds a personal prejudice
even though he found all the witnesses of one side were untrustworthy and
This Pittsburgh case seems to indicate that if
those of the other reliable.,
the record shows personal bias, the order of judgment will be reversed.
But it is submitted that the record seldom if ever will reflect that kind of
bias which will disqualify. However, one may prove personal bias by
affidavit in connection with a motion to disqualify. 5 '
"Every procedure which would offer a possible temptation to the
average man as a judge to forget the burden of proof required to convict
the defendant, or which might lead him not to hold the balance neat, clear,
and true between the state and the accused, denies the latter due process of
law."5

2

This case involved a town's mayor who received fines as his only

compensation for trying cases; if the defendant were not convicted the
mayor would receive nothing. The Court held that the pecuniary interest
of the mayor in the outcome of the case violated the due process clause.
The Wyoming Supreme Court held that a member of a judicial, quasi
judicial, or administrative body who seems apparently to be interested
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.

United States v. Morgan, 313 U.S. 409 (1941).
Morgan v. United States, 304 U.S. 1 (1938).
F.R.C. v. Cement Institute, 333 U.S. 683 (1948).
1 Davis. Administrative Law Treatise, § 12.01 at 217 (1958).
N.L.R.B. v. Donelly Garment Co., 830 U.S. 210 (1947).
36 Stat. 1090 (1911), 28 U.S.C.A., § 25, Judicial Code § 21.
Berger v. United States, 225 U.S. 22.
N.L.R.B. v. Pittsburgh S.S. Co., 337 U.S. 656 (1949).
Davis, 12.05 (7a of APA) ; 60 Stat. 237 (1946) ; 5 USCA 1001.
Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927).
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either directly or indirectly in the result of the hearing is under an obligation to disqualify himself, even if there is no actual interest of the official
in conflict with the duties of his office. The Court pointed out that, "The
best administration of our laws requires not only that the officers be fair,
impartial, and disinterested, but that they do not give an appearance to
the contrary."53 However, tripartite tribunals (those with two members
who are definitely partial, and one who is completely neutral) are frequently used. 54 Perhaps the reason for using this type of board is the
feeling that in submitting highly technical problems to a board it is more
advantageous to have the board comprised of highly skilled and informed
members even though they may also be members of an interested economic
group. Of course, the number of members who are known to be partisan
generally must be equal on each side. Furthermore, such agencies as state
medical and dental boards which are composed of members who have an
indirect interest are both permissible and necessary in view of the specialized nature of their functions.
Much of the thinking and ideas expressed so far become less significant
in the face of the "rule of necessity." 5 5

The Supreme Court of the United

States in determining the validity of taxing the income of federal judges
held that the plaintiff was entitled by law to invoke the Court's decision,
and since there was no other appellate tribunal which could decide, it
would consider the case even though the judges would be financially affected
by the decision.56 Automatic application of the rule may often result in
injustice,5 7 and one court has even held that application of the rule is a
denial of due process. 58 Professor Davis suggests, "In invoking the rule
of necessity the courts should always determine whether in the circumstances
the system of allowing decisions to be made disqualified officers should be
held to deny due process. And when the rule of necessity is applied, reviewing courts may well consider that the disqualification of the officers
makes appropriate an intensification of judicial review." 59
The Administrative Procedure Act, Section 7 (a) , provides that an
officer may disqualify himself or a party can file an affidavit of personal
bias (impersonal prejudice is not enough), and this shall be determined
by the agency and become part of the record and decision in the case.
However, Section 144 of Title 28 U.S.C. provides that if an affidavit is
timely and sufficient, a federal judge must automatically disqualify himself.
Each party is entitled to only one such affidavit in any case. Section 455
of Title 28 U.S.C. provides that a judge must disqualify himself if he has a
substantial interest, has been of counsel, is or has been a material witness,
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.

Lake De Smet Reservoir Co. v. Kaufman, 75 Wyo. 87, 292 P.2d 482 (1955).
The Railroad Adjustment Board is such a tribunal.
Davis, Administrative Law Text, § 12.03 (1959).
Evans v. Gore, 253 U.S. 245 (1920).
Mayor of City of Everett v. Superior Court, 23 Mass. 144, 85 N.E.2d 214 (1949);
Scannel v. Wolff, 86 Cal. App.2d 489, 195 P.2d 536 (1948).
Abrams v. Jones, 35 Idaho 532, 207 Pac. 723 (1922).
1 Davis, Administrative Law Treatise, § 12.06 (1958).
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or is so related to or connected with any party or his attorney as to render
it improper, in his opinion, for him to sit on the trial, appeal, or other
proceeding therein. The question of bias is subject to judicial review. 60
The term "timely" has been defined to mean "at the first reasonable
61
opportunity atfer discovery of the facts tending to show disqualification."
"Sufficient" means allegations of fact as distinguished from conclusions,
and the facts must be such that, taken to be true as stated, they would be
sufficient to convince an unbiased, unprejudiced and disinterested
mind. 62 The court in the Long Beach case held that an agency should be
given the first chance to hear and determine the question of bias. This is
consistent with the general rule that the agency should be given the first
chance to correct any defect in its activity. This court also said that when
a charge of bias is made, the agency must rule on the question as a condition precedent to its hearing the principal matter, in default of which
3
the court can stay the administrative proceedings
Finally, it should be pointed out that when a judge is disqualified,
his activity in the case is terminated, but an administrative presiding
officer, after disqualification, may still be active in the case so far as
investigation and prosecution of the case is concerned.
SEPARATION

OF

FUNCTIONS

The problem here is combining inconsistent functions such as investigation, prosecution including the initiation of proceedings, negotiating
settlements, and testifying with the function of judging or adjudicating.
The question is whether these inconsistent functions contaminate the
adjudication of a particular case. These inconsistent functions may be
performed by different sections or departments in the agency, by different
people in the same section or department, or by the same person or persons.
The mechanics and detailed ramifications of this problem are discussed in
"Administrative Adjudication in Wyoming," in this symposium. Only
the constitutional aspects will be dealt with here, and these are few. The
short of it is that no matter how undesirable it may be to combine various
inconsistent functions with adjudication, such combination to date has not
been held unconstitutional, 64 although state courts often mildly disapprove
such combinations of inconsistent functions. Some courts justify their
holdings by invoking the rule of necessity. Others merely express the view
that in such cases a closer scrutiny on judicial review is called for. 65
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.

65.

Sen. Doc. No. 248, 79th Cong., 2d Sess., 207, 269 (1946).
Long Beach Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n. v. Federal Home Loan Bank Board, 189 F. Supp.
589 (S.D. Cal. 1960); see also Chafin v. United States, 5 F.2d 592 (4th Cir. 1925).
Long Beach Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n. v. Federal Home Loan Bank Board, supra
note 61.
Also see § 10d of the Administrative Procedure Act.
Marcello v. Bonds, 349 U.S. 302 (1955); Belizaro v. Zimmerman, 200 F.2d 242 (3d
Cir.). The Supreme Court of Wyoming approved the act permitting the Board
of Control to both investigate and adjudicate priority of water rights. Farm Investment Co. v. Carpenter, 9 Wyo. 110, 261 Pac. 258 (1900) ; and Simmons v. Ramsbotton, 51 Wyo. 419, 68 P.2d 153 (1937).
1 Davis, Administrative Law Treatise, § 13.02 (1958).
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The Wyoming Supreme Court has recently implied that statutes permitting the fire marshall to promulgate necessary rules and regulations and
determine when there has been a violation of these and other fire regulations, with no provisions for notice, hearing, judicial finds or judicial
review, were constitutional. The Court justified its position by stating
that the subject matter was within the police powers of the state, affecting
the health safety, and welfare of the people. The Court also said that
protection is afforded from actions which are arbitrary, fradulent, collusive
or otherwise illegal by the court's inherent power to review actions of
officials and agencies in such cases. 66
RETROACTIVITY

Retroactive legislation deemed unreasonable violates the due process
clause. 67 An unreasonable application of a law or regulation may occur
in an area where the law is pretty well settled. 68 The federal constitutional
prohibition of ex post facto is limited by judicial construction to criminal
cases and does not apply to civil legislation or regulations. 69 Article 1,
Section 35 of the Wyoming Constitution provides, "No ex post facto law,
nor any law impairing the obligation of contract shall ever be made."
An ex post facto law has been defined as "A law passed after the occurrence
of a fact or commission of an act, which retrospectively changes the legal
consequences or relations of such fact or deed."
The Wyoming Supreme Court has held that a plain rule of the State
Board of Equalization which had stood for more than a decade, and had
never been repealed or changed, should not be disregarded and its interpretation changed so as to retroactively and unjustly affect taxpayers
dealing with the board in such matters. The Court also said that these
rules carry decided weight when the board attempts to impose a sales tax
contrary to the rule. Furthermore, the Court said that generally the
regulations of an administrative agency should, as concerns the effect
of a retroactive change, be likened to judgments of a court of final
appeal rather than to judgments of a trial court. Thus, the Court seemed
to stress the importance of the plainness, and long standing of the previous
rule and the unjust effect of the change. The Wyoming Court also refused
to permit a rule to be applied retroactively which was issued by the Board
of Education, defining first class teacher's certificates which were required
by statute in order to qualify the holder for the position of county superintendent of schools. 70 Article 1, Section 35 has been held to be an "emphatic
66.

Brinegar v. Clark, 371 P.2d 62 (Wyo. 1962). But see discussion of this case in Note,

Administrative Rule Making in Wyoming, infra p. 255.

67.

Welch v. Henry, 305 U.S. 134.

68.

S.E.C. v. Chenery Corporation, 322 U.S. 194 (1947).

69.
70.

Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 286.
Lynch v. Board of County Commissioners, 75 Wyo. 435, 296 P.2d 986.

Here, the

Court did not base its decision on constitutional principles, but citing 82 C.J.S. 414
said: "We might incidently state that the Board of Education made its latest rule in
October, 1954, after the relator had been nominated for the office she now holds.
Retrospective legislation is not favored. That should apply to rules and regulations.
Hence, even if the rule in question were such as to govern in the future we ought

not apply it to the relator in this case."

NOTES

command" to the state ligislature in connection with retroactivity. 71 The
general rule is that statutes are construed to operate prospectively unless
the legislative intent that they be given retrospective or retroactive operation clearly appears from the express language of the acts or by necessary
7
or unavoidable implication. 2
The United States Supreme Court in the Chenery case held that even
though an agency has general rule making power, it may also proceed by
adjudication on a case by case basis. In one sense of the word, any legal
principle arrived at by the latter method will have a retroactive effect, at
least to the parties concerned. However, this is also inherent in our
common law court procedures.
EXTRAORDINARY

WRITS

A question may arise as to whether the extraordinary writs may be
abolished by the legislature. This may be answered in the affirmative in
the absence of any constitutional restrictions. 73 The general rule is that a
person does not have a vested or constitutional right to any certain
remedy.74 The Iowa Constitution, like the Wyoming Constitution provides for these extraordinary writs under the judicial section. 75 The only
difference is that in the Wyoming Constitution some of these writs are
specifically named, while in the Iowa Constitution they are referred to as
"all writs and processes." The Iowa court holds that their mention in the
constitution does not establish them as constitutionally guaranteed remedies. 76 There is one exception. The Iowa Constitution provides for the
writ of habeas corpus and specifies that it shall not be abolished or suspended unless, when in the case of rebellion or invasion the public safety
may require it.
However, in some states where the constitution empowers the supreme
court or other courts to issue such extraordinary writs, it has been held that
the legislature is not competent to change or modify the scope of these
remedies. Wyoming is probably one of these. 77 The Wyoming Supreme
Court, in deciding Loomis v. Dahlen, held that where the remedy of
certiorari is created or guaranteed by constitutional provisions (Wyo.
Const. Art. 1, Secs. 3 and 10) it may not be taken away by the legislature.
The Court also held that the writ may be used in proper cases in Wyoming,
nothwithstanding Wyo. Comp. Stat. 6392 (1920) which attempted to
71.

Jansen v. Afton, 59 Wyo. 500, 143 P.2d 190.

72.
73.
74.
75.

82 C.J.S. 981. For example, see, Wyo. Comp. Stat. § 34-67 (1957).
74 C.J.S. 5 (1955).
Home Building & Loan Assn. v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934).
Iowa Cont., Art V, § 4; Wyo. Cont., Art. V, § 3.

76.

State v. Wineshiek Coop. Burial Assn., 234 Iowa 1196, 15 N.W.2d 367 (1944); and
Dosman v. Thompson, 204 Iowa 1254, 215 N.W. 261 (1927).

77.

Loomis v. Dahlen, 37 Wyo. 498, 263 Pac. 708 (1928). But see, Call v. Afton, 73
Wyo. 271, 278 P.2d 270 (1954), in which the Supreme Court of Wyoming said
"Perhaps neither this section, giving power to issue the writ of certiorari, nor Section
3-5323, W.C.S. (1945), abolishing such writs in civil cases should be entirely disregarded. Effect perhaps may be given to each by keeping provisions of this section
within its proper limits."
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abolish certiorari in civil cases, because the Constitution was adopted after
the enactment of the statute, and the framers of the Constitution must have
thought it wise that the right to issue the writ should exist.
It is generally held that unless such power is conferred on the legislature by its constitution, it has no power to confer or withdraw jurisdiction
or judicial power. The judicial -power of the courts is controlled by the
constitution and statutes enacted pursuant thereto. 78 No such power is
given the legislature in the Wyoming Constitution with reference to remedies. However, the legislature may limit jurisdiction by providing that
only certain courts may hear certain types of cases. The legislature may
also impose venue restrictions. Furthermore, the Congress cannot create
or regulate state courts. Even though it can authorize these courts to
enforce a cause of action created by a federal act, it cannot require them
to do so. 7 9 The above mentioned denial of power to regulate jurisdiction
of courts applies to appellate jurisdiction as well as original jurisdiction,
absent constitutional authorization. Again, there is no such power to
regulate appellate jurisdiction in the Wyoming Constitution. Even so,
it would seem that unless the scope of a remedy were defined in the constitution, the legislature might supplement the remedies, even though it
could not abolish them.
CONSTITUTIONAL

AGENCIES

Several administrative agencies or boards have been specifically provided for in the Wyoming Constitution. They are: The Board of Land
Commissioners, the Board of Water Control, the Board of Equalization, the
Board of Arbitrators, the Board of Charities and Reforms, the Board of
County Commissioners, and the Board of Canvassers.
The Board of Land Commissioners8 0 is the only authority vested with
the power to lease lands owned by the state. 8 ' In the absence of fraud or
abuse the Land Commissioners have wide discretion. Furthermore, an
omission of a restrictive clause in a statute relating to leasing shows that
the legislature meant to increase the discretion of this board.8 2 Accordingly, the legislature may limit and direct the functions of the Board, but
the statute must be clear and definite.8 3 However, in Frolander v. Ilsley,
and Sullivan v. Veer, cited above, the Court held that the Board could not
refuse a perference right of renewal of a lease on light, trivial or technical
grounds that the greatest benefit to the state would not be subserved by
78.
79.

80.

21 C.J.S. 120-122 (1955).
21 C.J.S. 125 (1955).

Wyo. Const., Art. 18, § 3. This section supersedes Wyo. Const.. Art. 7, § 13, by
adding the following language: "And said board, subject to the limitations of this

81.

82.

constitution and under such regulations as may be provided by law shall have
the direction, control, disposition and care of all lands that have been heretofore
or may hereafter be granted to the state." Statutory provisions for this board are
Wyo. Stat. §§ 36-14 to 36-41 (1957).
Banzhaf v. Swan Co., 60 Wyo. 201, 148 P.2d 225 (1944).
Frolander v. Ilsley, 72 Wyo. 342, 264 P.2d 790 (1954); Banzhaf v. Swan Co., supra
note 81, and Sullivan v. Veer, 58 Wyo. 90,

83.

125 P.2d

168 (1952).

Wyo. Const., Art. 18, § 4; Mahoney v. L. I. Sheep Co., 79 Wyo. 293, 333 P.2d 714
(1958).

NOTES

granting it. Thus it would seem that the courts may control the Board's
acivity to the extent of deciding whether its grounds are substantial enough
to support its decision.
In the absence of review by a district court the decisions of the Board
of Water Control are res judicata.8 4 That is to say, the decisions can only
be attacked directly by seeking judicial review. In the Horse Creek case
the Wyoming Supreme Court held that the act conferring the power to
adjudicate the priorities of the various claimants to the use of public
waters of the state is not unconstitutional as investing the Board with
judicial powers. Possibly this is because there is not only concurrent
jurisdiction but also the proceedings are subject to judicial review. However, in the absence of fraud or collusion, the proceedings may not be
attacked in an independent action.8 5 Even thoungh the Board's statutory
jurisdiction is concurrent with the courts 6 the Supreme Court held that
the Board may have complete discretion in certain areas such as defining
the meaning of a stream.8 7 Furthermore, the jurisdiction of the courts,
in matters of water adjudication is except for appeals, confined to determining the rights in individual cases to the extent that the Board of Water
Control has not acted. 88 Other constutional ramifications of water law are
beyond the scope of this article.
It is submitted that providing for specific administrative agencies or
boards with specific functions in the state constitutions might not have
been wise. Some of these specific provisions may become outdated and
obsolete. Different and more efficient entities and methods for accomplishing the same functions might be devised. In short, times and circumstances may change and thus bring about need for a comparable change
in the administrative procedure. However, with specific agencies with
specific functions enumerated in the constitution the change will become
more difficult to effect, because the amending of a constitution is a
rather burdensome and time-consuming procedure.
One provision in the Wyoming Constitution, Article 3, Setcion 24,
may cause trouble with respect to the enabling legislation for an administrative agency and the functions and activties of these. The section
provides that no bill except general appropriation bills and bills for the
codification and general revision of the laws shall be passed containing
more than one subject which shall be clearly expressed in its title; but if
any subject is embraced in any act which is not expressed in the title,
such act shall be void only as to so much thereof as shall not be so ex-

85.

Horse Creek Conservation District v. Lincoln Land Co., 50 Wyo. 229, 59 P.2d 763
(1936). The constitutional provisions for the Board of Control are found in Wyo.
Const., Art. 8, § 2; the statutory provisions for the Board are Wyo. Stat. §§
41-154 to 41-164 (1957).
Farm Investment Co. v. Carpenter et al., 9 Wyo. 110, 61 Pac. 258 (1900).

86.

Simmons v. Ramesbottom, 57 Wyo. 419, 68 P.2d 153 (1937).

84.

87.
88.

Laramie Irr. & Power Co. v. Grant, 44 Wyo. 392, 13 P.2d 235 (1932).
Campbell v. Wyo. Development Co., 55 Wyo. 347, 100 P.2d 124 (1940). Rehearing
denied, 55 Wyo. 347, 102 P.2d 745 (1940).
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pressed. However, the section should be liberally and reasonably construed.80 The objections should be grave and the conflict between the
act and the constitution should be palpable before the judiciary should
disregard or annul a legislative enactment solely because of this section of
the constitution. 90 The problem may be avoided by making the title to the
legislation as broad and general as possible because it is necessary only that
the agencies function or activity may be fitted into a section or provision
of the respective act which is germane to the subject expressed in its title. 9 '
It has been held that the title of an act of the legislature may be sufficiently
general and comprehensive to embrace every means and end necessary or
convenient for the accomplishment of the general purpose expressed
therein. 92 Furthermore, any territorial legislation still in existence is not
affected by the section because it is not to be applied retroactively.9 3
CONCLUSION

As the reader has no doubt already discovered this article is a combination of various loose ends not otherwise treated in the symposium.
Thus a summary is impossible without a complete rehash of the entire
article. All the conclusions which the writer could make have already
been made in the text. However, mention of the various topics and subtopics may serve in lieu of a summary and for conclusion.
When and under what circumstances a hearing is required was discussed. In connection with this the subtopics of adjudicative as distinguished from legislative facts, and privileges as distinguished from rights
were discussed. The requirements of a proper hearing were discussed, along
with the subtopics, notice, opportunity to be heard, public hearing vel
non, jury trial, bias, and right to counsel. The problem of separation of
functions and the problem of retroactive application of rules and regulations as well as new interpretations thereof were also discussed. Mention
was made of the Wyoming Constitution's effect on extraordinary writs.
Mention was also made of various agencies specifically provided for in the
Wyoming Constitution. Finally, the problem which all Wyoming legislation faces was discussed, to wit: Article 3, Section 24 limiting statutory
enactments to a single subject matter.
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